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Abstract 
 
This paper considers logistic (asymmetric) and exponential (symmetric) smooth transition 
adjustments of real and nominal exchange rates for six major oil-exporting countries in response 
to different shocks affecting oil prices.  Real exchange rate movements affect the terms of trade 
and hence may affect relative competitiveness. We detect no statistically significant non-linearities 
for the adjustment process of real exchange rate returns, be they asymmetric or symmetric, in 
response to oil supply shocks, idiosyncratic oil-market-specific shocks, and speculative (crude oil 
inventory) oil-market shocks. On the other hand, global aggregate demand shocks, which are 
shocks that do not directly originate in the oil market, have nonlinear asymmetric effects on real 
exchange rate returns for Canada, Mexico, Norway and Russia, and linear effects for the UK.  
These qualitative results mostly hold for nominal exchange rate returns as well.  Exceptions are 
that linear effects are found for aggregate demand shocks for Brazil and for idiosyncratic shocks 
for Norway, whereas the aggregate demand shocks for the UK have nonlinear and asymmetric 
effects instead of linear ones.   
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1. Introduction 
A large number of studies explored the empirical relationship between oil prices and exchange 
rates with mainly three different types of econometric tools: linear cointegration methods, linear 
and nonlinear Granger-causality tests, and linear vector autoregression (VAR) models. For 
example, Amano and van Norden (1998) used linear cointegration tests and Granger causality tests 
and found a positive long-run relationship between real oil prices and US-dollar exchange rates.  
However, Reboredo (2012) found instead weak evidence for co-movements between nominal oil 
prices and exchange rates of several oil exporting and oil importing countries. Linear and nonlinear 
correlations and copula functions for symmetric and asymmetric co-movements, which may vary 
over time, were considered.   
In a seminal paper Kilian (2009) showed that the impact of an oil price change on the economy 
depends upon whether the oil price change is due to an oil supply shock, a global aggregate demand 
shock, or an oil-market-specific demand shock.  Numerous studies followed using Kilian’s (2009) 
framework to analyze the effects of these oil-market shocks on macroeconomic and financial 
variables in various countries.  Atems et al. (2015) and Basher et al. (2016) used Kilian’s (2009) 
methodology in order to study the effects of these oil-market shocks on exchange rates. Atems et 
al. (2015) found that whether US exchange rates respond asymmetrically to oil-market shocks 
depends on the size and sign of a shock, using an exchange rate model with otherwise linear 
relationships.  Basher et al. (2016) used instead a nonlinear Markov-switching model for exchange 
rates and found only limited evidence that oil supply shocks affect exchange rates, whereas global 
aggregate demand shocks played an important role.1      
There is an ongoing debate in the literature about whether the effects of oil price shocks have 
linear or nonlinear effects on other macroeconomic variables.  Mork (1989) argued that increasing 
real oil prices have significantly different effects on US real GDP growth compared to declining 
oil prices.  Hamilton (1996, 2003) used a net oil price increase to model effects of oil prices.  His 
net oil price measure is defined as observed oil price increases that represent new highs relative to 
the recent experience, or reversals of recent decreases, and zero values in other periods without 
                                                          
1 The regime classification measures (RCMs) for the fit of the Markov-switching models reveal relatively large 
values for oil exporting countries, indicating room for improvements in nonlinear modelling by using alternative 
models.  The Markov model with t-distributed innovations seems to achieve a low value (of 7.84 in Table 6, p. 21) 
only for Russia.  Other values for oil exporters in Table 6 range from 39.30 (UK) to 74.07 (Canada) and from 22.46 
(UK) to 86.66 (Norway) in Table 5 (p. 19) for normally distributed innovations.  The RCM can take values from 0 
(perfect regime classification) to 100 (no regime classification is detected).  
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such changes. On the other hand, Kilian and Vigfusson (2011a, 2011b) discussed econometric 
issues in regard to oil price shocks and presented empirical evidence in favor of effects on output 
being linear and symmetric.2 Instead, a threshold model, say with smooth transition between 
regimes, allows estimating the adjustment process itself from the data without imposing a strict 
formula for switches as Hamilton’s net oil price does.  Flexible nonlinear functional forms can be 
specified for alternative processes for such smooth transition regression models that are symmetric 
or asymmetric for adjustments in response to negative and positive changes (Teräsvirta et al., 
2010).  An alternative nonlinear model is a Markov-switching model that determines regimes from 
the data as well, pursued in Basher et al. (2016) and Basher et al. (2017).   
In this paper, we employ a nonlinear smooth transition model for modelling the effects of oil-
market shocks on exchange rates.  In contrast to Markov-switching models where the adjustment 
process is abrupt and in a way a “black box,” smooth transition models specify the functional form 
of the adjustment process and are explicit about what variables drive the process.  These types of 
smooth transition models have been successfully used to model the time series behavior of 
exchange rate movements (see, e.g., and Kilian and Taylor, 2003, and Taylor et al., 2001) but have 
not yet been used to explain how exchange rates react to changes in oil prices, as far as we know.      
Kilian and Murphy (2014) extended the oil-market model of Kilian (2009) by including as an 
additional variable changes to above-ground global crude oil inventories.  This allows for explicit 
identification of oil-market shocks due to speculative trading in the crude oil market.  We employ 
both models to derive the oil-market shocks:  Kilian’s (2009) model and alternatively the extended 
oil-market model of Kilian and Murphy (2014).  The latter model allows to separate the oil-market-
specific demand shock in Kilian (2009) into an idiosyncratic oil-market-specific demand shock 
and an explicitly identified speculative (crude oil inventory) demand shock. We follow Kilian 
(2009) and apply a two-stage approach to examine the response of the real exchange rate to oil 
price shocks.  We first estimate a structural VAR model with monthly data, following (i) Kilian 
(2009) with a Cholesky identification scheme and (ii) Kilian and Murphy (2014) by imposing 
contemporaneous and dynamic sign restrictions and bounds for short-run price elasticities of oil 
production and “demand for oil in use” in order to identify structural oil-market shocks. We then 
analyze the impact of these shocks on exchange rates in second-stage regressions.   
                                                          
2 See the reply by Hamilton (2011).  For a comprehensive recent study with different definitions of net oil price 
increases see Herrera et al. (2016). 
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We consider as a transition variable in the nonlinear model, in turn, each of the oil-market 
shocks. The transition variable triggers the transition from one regime to another and allows for a 
smooth transition, or abrupt transition as a limiting case.  The logistic form renders asymmetric 
transitions so that positive and negative shocks can have different transition paths.  On the other 
hand, the exponential transition function renders symmetric transition paths for positive and 
negative shocks.  The potential nonlinearity takes two forms that have been used commonly and 
successfully for nonlinear modelling in economics and finance.3 
Most of the literature on the effects of oil price changes has concentrated on the US economy.  
A good number of papers studied oil-importing countries but there are only a few that considered 
oil-exporting countries.  This paper contributes to the literature on the effects of oil price changes 
for developed and emerging oil-exporting countries by allowing for potentially nonlinear effects 
on real exchange rates, which affect a country’s terms of trade and therefore may affect its 
competitiveness.  We choose for our analysis major net oil exporting countries for which sufficient 
data for flexible exchange rate periods are available:  Canada, Brazil, Mexico, Norway, Russia, 
and the UK.4 These countries are among the top twenty crude oil exporters in 2009 (Europe’s 
Energy Portal, 2016) and comprise developed (Canada, Norway, and the UK) as well as emerging 
economies (Brazil, Mexico, and Russia).   
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of the related literature on 
exchange rates and Section 3 describes the econometric models, the data and presents the results. 
Section 4 concludes the paper.   
 
2. Related literature: a brief review 
 The theoretical literature on exchange rates considered two channels through which an oil 
price shock can be transmitted to a country’s exchange rate:  the terms of trade channel and the 
wealth effect channel. The terms of trade channel was explored, for example, by Backus and 
Crucini (2000), and Chen and Rogoff (2003).  For oil-exporting countries, an increase in oil prices 
generally leads to improvements of the trade balance and subsequently to an appreciation of the 
local currency, which may eventually lead to a Dutch Disease problem by driving up the price of 
                                                          
3 See Granger and Teräsvirta (1993), Teräsvirta (1994, 1998), Teräsvirta et al. (2010), and Ma and Wohar (2014).  
4 For most of the estimation period the UK was a net crude oil exporter, except since 2005 when it became a net 
importer.  See https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.cfm?id=16971. 
4 
 
the non-tradable goods (Buetzer et al., 2012).  Empirical support for this view was presented by 
Backus and Crucini (2000), showing that oil price changes determine most of the variation in the 
terms of trade.  
The distinction between oil-exporting and oil-importing countries appears particularly 
important for the wealth effect channel.  An increase in oil prices is associated with a wealth 
transfer from oil-importing to oil-exporting countries that leads to a real appreciation of the 
exchange rates of the oil-exporting country due to portfolio reallocations (e.g., Buetzer et al., 2012, 
and Fratzscher et al., 2014). The basic theory for the wealth channel was developed by Golub 
(1983) and Krugman (1983), and related empirical evidence was presented in Kilian et al. (2009) 
and Bodenstein et al. (2011), among others. 
Early research on the relationship between oil prices and exchange rates commonly applied 
linear cointegration methods and Granger causality tests.   Numerous studies reported finding 
evidence of an appreciation of the US dollar in response to rising oil prices.  In reviewing the large 
and growing literature on the relationship between exchange rates and oil prices, Coudert et al. 
(2011) found a long-run elasticity between oil prices and exchange rates of 0.3 for oil exporting 
countries.  In contrast to these studies, Buetzer et al. (2012) used the two-step approach of Kilian 
(2009) for assessing the impact of oil price shocks on exchange rates. They analyzed in a linear 
framework their impact on nominal and real exchange rates, as well as stock returns, for 44 
advanced and emerging countries.  Oil supply and global aggregate demand shocks are found to 
not systematically lead to an appreciation of oil exporters’ currencies relative to oil importers’, 
contrary to the predictions of theory.  On the other hand, oil-market specific demand shocks do 
exert pressure on oil exporters’ currencies to appreciate.  Basher et al. (2012) extended Kilian’s 
(2009) three-variable linear structural VAR model of the crude oil market to include other key 
macroeconomic variables and found no significant effects of oil supply shocks on exchange rates, 
whereas an unanticipated global demand expansion lead to a depreciation of the US dollar.  
Furthermore, the impact of a positive oil-market-specific demand shock was also negative 
(reflecting the so-called numeraire effect). These findings supported the conclusion that exchange 
rate movements are determined primarily by current account movements (Krugman, 1983). 
Atems et al. (2015) studied the role of Kilian’s (2009) oil-market shocks for real and trade-
weighted exchange rates for net oil importers and exporters.  They separated each of the three oil-
market shocks into negative and positive shocks and alternatively into large and small shocks and 
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considered linear adjustment processes for these shocks.  Basher et al. (2016) explored instead 
nonlinearities for the adjustment effects of the three oil-market shocks on real exchange rates of 
oil exporters and importers.  The nonlinearities were modelled in the form of Markov-type regime 
changes, however, the model fit was somewhat questionable for oil exporting countries (see 
footnote 1).  Atems et al. (2015) and Basher et al. (2016) found that global oil supply shocks have 
generally no statistically significant, or only very limited effects, on real exchange rates.  They 
further found that positive oil-market-specific demand shocks usually lead to an appreciation of 
currencies of oil-exporting countries but these effects are at times borderline cases for the 95% 
confidence bands reported.  On the other hand, global aggregate demand shocks generally had 
statistically significant effects on real exchange rates in both studies, but a clear pattern did not 
always emerge for oil-exporting countries.  
 
3. Econometric methodology, data, and results 
3.1 Modelling nonlinear smooth adjustment 
An important advantage of smooth transition models, in comparison to other available 
nonlinear models, is that nonlinear models can be specified in a relatively parsimonious way so 
that only a small number of parameters needs to be estimated and samples do not have to be 
particularly large to achieve reliable statistical inference.  Hamilton (2016) surveyed and compared 
various nonlinear econometric models, i.e., models with regime changes, available in the literature, 
and pointed out (pp. 33-34) that smooth transition models allow basing the changes in regime on 
the entire history of the transition variable (i.e., its time series process) and not just on a single 
value (probability) as in the standard Markov switching model.   
We will consider smooth transition regression (STR) models, however, the threshold case with 
abrupt change from one regime to another is embedded as a special case when the adjustment 
speed goes to infinity. We determine how real exchange rate returns react to oil-market shocks 
empirically, in particular, we estimate the adjustment speeds.  Negative and positive oil-market 
shocks can have different effects and also small and large oil-market shocks (in absolute terms) 
are allowed to influence exchange rates differently.  Our model therefore allows us to test 
Hamilton’s (1996, 2003) hypothesis that only oil price increases matter.  We should note that we 
do not model the time-series behavior of exchange rates themselves but rather assess only the 
impact that oil-market shocks have on them, following the two-step methodology of Kilian (2009).  
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We estimate a nonlinear model of the form 
∆𝑓𝑥𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1
′𝑋𝑡 + (𝛽2
′𝑋𝑡)𝐹(𝜏𝑡;  𝛾,  𝑘) +  𝜆∆𝑓𝑥𝑡−1 +   𝜂𝑡,                                (1) 
where Δfxt is the change in the log exchange rate, and F(·), the transition function, is generally 
bounded between 0 and 1, γ is a positive parameter indicating how fast the transition from one 
regime to another occurs, k locates where the transition occurs, and τt is a covariance-stationary and 
ergodic transition variable. Xt is a vector of regressors that contains in our case just one of the oil-
market shocks, and β1 and β2 are associated parameters.  We include the lag on the exchange rate 
as it improves the fit of the model.  
The transition variable triggers the smooth transition from one regime to another (Granger 
and Teräsvirta, 1993; Teräsvirta, 1994, 1998). Generally, the transition function is assumed to be 
either of the logistic (LSTR) or exponential (ESTR) form.  The class of nonlinear models is infinite.  
But, the choice of LSTR and ESTR models is based on a relatively simple form with only a few 
parameters to estimate.  Also, we rely on the successful application of such models to exchange 
rate behavior in the literature and on the availability of a complete econometric toolkit for 
estimation and inference.   
In the LSTR model, the transition function is monotonically increasing in the transition 
variable:   
 𝐹(𝜏𝑡; 𝛾, 𝑘) = {1 + exp [−𝛾(𝜏𝑡 − 𝑘)]}
−1,  γ>0.                                                                (2) 
The logistic function 𝐹(𝜏𝑡; 𝛾, 𝑘) is bounded between 0 and 1 as τt increases from small (negative) 
values to large (positive) values.  When 𝜏𝑡= k it has a value of 0.5.  In our applications we set k=0 
so that our model distinguishes between negative and positive values of τt, i.e., we allow regimes 
to be different for positive and negative values of τt .  We consider for the transition variable in turn 
each of the oil-market shocks, denoted 𝜀𝑖𝑡.  Therefore, we allow for negative and positive oil-
market shocks to affect exchange rates differently and in addition we allow in each case for the 
size of the oil-market shock to influence its effect on exchange rate returns.  For large values of the 
transitions speed parameter γ, the transition of 𝐹(𝜏𝑡; 𝛾, 𝑘) from 0 to 1 becomes almost 
instantaneous.  Hence, the LSTR model nests a two-regime threshold model with abrupt regime 
changes as a special case as γ → ∞. On the other hand, when γ = 0 the logistic function equals a 
constant (0.5) and the LSTR model reduces to a linear model. 
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The ESTR model is a non-monotonic alternative that is symmetric around k. It allows for 
different behavior for large and small deviations from the threshold k, regardless of the sign of the 
deviation: 
𝐹(𝜏𝑡; 𝛾, 𝑘) = 1 − 𝑒𝑥𝑝 [−𝛾(𝜏𝑡 − 𝑘)
2],   γ>0. 
 
The exponential function 𝐹(𝜏𝑡; 𝛾, 𝑘) → 1 as 𝜏𝑡 → − ∞  and also as 𝜏𝑡 →  ∞, and further 𝐹(𝜏𝑡; 𝛾, 𝑘) 
= 1 for 𝜏𝑡= k.  Setting 𝜏𝑡= 𝜀𝑖𝑡 and k = 0 allows for an inner regime around the point where shocks 
are zero (𝜏𝑡= 𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 0 and F( ∙ ) = 0 ) and the adjustment process of exchange rates becomes linear 
in equation (1).  For large shocks, in absolute terms, when 𝜏𝑡 → ±∞, the ESTR function F( ∙ ) →
1 and describes an outer regime for which equation (1) becomes in the limit a different linear 
model.  The ESTR process is a generalization of a two-regime threshold model.  The adjustment 
process for positive and negative oil-market shocks is the same in the ESTR model.   
The adjustment speed γ and location parameter k can be estimated via nonlinear least 
squares.  A problem arises because equation (1) is not identified under the null hypothesis of 
linearity. Teräsvirta (1994, 1998) suggested estimating an auxiliary regression instead: 
∆𝑓𝑥𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1
′𝑋𝑡 + 𝛿0
′𝑋𝑡𝜏𝑡 +  𝛿1
′𝑋𝑡𝜏𝑡
2 +  𝛿2
′𝑋𝑡𝜏𝑡
3 +  𝜆∆𝑓𝑥𝑡−1 +   𝜂𝑡,                   (3) 
where the null hypothesis of linearity is given by 𝛿0
′ = 𝛿1
′ = 𝛿2
′ = 0.  Testing the LSTR against the 
ESTR model within equation (3) implies testing 𝛿2
′=0, because the ESTR model requires that this 
coefficient is zero.  It is important that t is moment stationary up to a certain order.  We consider 
each of the oil-market shocks in separation to keep the nonlinear model parsimonious.   
 
   3.2 The identification of global oil-market shocks 
Our identification of the structural shocks of the global oil market is based on two alternative 
structural VAR (SVAR) models: Kilian 2009) and Kilian and Murphy (2014). In Kilian (2009), 
the global oil market consists of three variables: one supply and two demand variables. The supply 
variable is a vertical short-run oil supply curve (i.e., flow supply), a demand variable representing 
aggregate demand for global industrial commodities (i.e., flow demand) and an oil-specific demand 
variable that reflects the real price of oil (i.e., other demand). The residual demand shock thus 
captures a whole array of other shocks to oil prices besides flow demand and flow supply shocks. 
In addition to the fundamental laws of supply and demand, expectations play an important role in 
setting the price of oil. For example, concerns about future supply shortfalls or rising demand leads 
to a higher demand for crude oil inventories in the current period, causing the price of oil to rise 
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instantaneously. In this way, the change in crude oil inventories above the ground reflects 
speculative motives in regards to future oil price movements. It also highlights the degree of 
concerns about future oil supplies, including precautionary motives and strategic oil reserves. The 
main mechanism underlying these dynamics is the storability of oil, allowing oil traders to take 
advantage of both rising and falling markets. 
To account for the expectations channel of the global oil market explicitly, Kilian and Murphy 
(2014) added a speculative demand shock (measured by an unexpected change in crude oil 
inventories) to the SVAR model. In contrast, the oil-market specific demand shocks in Kilian’s 
(2009) model only indirectly identify speculative (or precautionary) oil demand shocks.  On the 
other hand, the flow oil-supply variable reflects any speculative behavior of oil producers, such as 
pumping less crude oil from below-ground in anticipation of higher future oil prices.  It must be 
noted that due to the inclusion of inventories, the SVAR of Kilian and Murphy (2014) can no 
longer be identified recursively as in Kilian (2009); instead Kilian and Murphy (2014) use a 
combination of sign restrictions and bounds on the short-run price elasticities of oil demand and 
oil supply in order to identify the four structural shocks in the model.  
 
3.2.1 Identification and estimation of the SVAR model 
3.2.1.1 The oil-market SVAR as in Kilian (2009) 
The first step of the analysis is to consider an SVAR: 
𝐴0𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴(𝐿)𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡,                                   (4) 
where yt includes for t=1, …, n  (i) the percentage change in global oil production (prod), (ii) a 
measure of global economic activity  (rea), and (iii) the natural logarithm of the real oil price (rpo); 
𝜀𝑡 denotes the vector of serially and mutually uncorrelated structural innovations. The orthogonal 
structural innovations are estimated by imposing exclusion restrictions on 𝐴0
−1 (see Kilian, 2009) 
𝑦𝑡 = 𝐴0
−1𝐴(𝐿)𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝑒𝑡,                                                   (5) 
with et a vector of VAR errors such that 𝑒𝑡 = 𝐴0
−1𝜀𝑡.  The reduced form VAR errors in equation 
(5), et , have no economic interpretation as they are correlated with each other.  However, the errors 
in the structural VAR, 𝜀𝑡, do have economic meaning.  For our three-variable VAR the identifying 
structure is as follows:  
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𝑒𝑡 = (
𝑒1𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑
𝑒2𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑎
𝑒3𝑡
𝑟𝑝𝑜
) = [
𝑎11 0 0
𝑎21 𝑎22 0
𝑎31 𝑎32 𝑎33
](
𝜀1𝑡
𝑠
𝜀2𝑡
𝑑
𝜀3𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐
)                                             (6) 
The three structural shocks are attributed as follows: 𝜀1𝑡
𝑠  denotes shocks to the global supply 
(production) of crude oil that is available above the ground, the “oil supply shock”; 𝜀2𝑡
𝑑  denotes 
shocks to the global demand for all industrial commodities that are driven by global real economic 
activity, the “aggregate demand shock;” and 𝜀3𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑒𝑐
 denotes an oil-market-specific demand shock, 
the “precautionary demand shock.” The identification of the parameters in 𝐴0
−1 is achieved by 
imposing a recursive Cholesky ordering as in Kilian (2009, pp. 1059-1060), who explained in 
detail the rationale for it.  The crude oil supply production is assumed not to respond to innovations 
to the demand for oil within the same month.  Global real economic activity does respond to oil 
supply shocks within the month but responds to shocks that are specific to the oil market with a 
delay of a month, i.e., it does not respond contemporaneously.  This restriction reflects sluggish 
adjustment of global real economic activity in response to oil price shocks.  Last, the real price of 
oil is allowed to respond to shocks to both oil production and global real economic activity shocks 
within the same month. This allows for any exogenous changes in crude oil supply or the real 
economy to be immediately reflected in oil prices.  The oil-market-specific demand shock itself 
can capture shifts in the price of oil that are due to precautionary demand changes that reflect how 
concerned markets are about the availability of future oil supplies.  
For our sample period, standard DF-GLS tests of Elliott et al. (1996) show evidence in favor 
of unit roots for the global real economic activity variable and for the log of the real oil price, but 
these two variables are cointegrated (see Section 3.5.1).  On the other hand, the percentage change 
in the oil supply is stationary in levels.  Our oil-market VAR specification therefore fits the cases 
illustrated by Sims et al. (1990).   Sims et al. (1990) showed that the estimated coefficients of the 
VAR model in levels are consistent and asymptotically normally distributed when unit roots and 
cointegration are present in the data. Put differently, it is not essential to impose cointegration to 
achieve consistency of the estimates.5  
 
                                                          
5 Moreover, Hamilton (1994, pp. 651-653) cautioned against imposing invalid cointegration restrictions. Also, we 
note that it is incorrect to use first-differences of variables (that have unit roots) in a VAR when cointegration is 
present because then missing error-correction terms create omitted variables bias.   
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3.2.1.2 The oil-market SVAR as in Kilian and Murphy (2014) 
The vector yt in equations (4) and (5) is expanded to include now four variables: global oil 
inventory changes in levels (inv) are added.  The orthogonal structural innovations are again 
estimated from the reduced form estimates.  As the oil inventory data tend to show seasonal swings, 
the reduced-form VAR is estimated using seasonal dummies. Furthermore, as shown below in 
Section 3.5.1, three of the four variables in this model have unit root behavior and in addition 
exhibit a cointegrating relationship.  Therefore, a VAR in levels is appropriate for this expanded 
model as well.  The structural shocks 𝜀1𝑡
𝑠  and 𝜀1𝑡
𝑑  have the same interpretation as before; 𝜀3𝑡
𝑖𝑑𝑖 refers 
to all other (residual) oil-market specific idiosyncratic demand shocks, labelled “idiosyncratic 
shock” that are not important determinants of the real price of oil; and 𝜀4𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑣 is a shock due to 
unexpected changes in above-ground oil inventories that capture speculative motives related to 
concerns over future oil demand and supply, an “inventory shock” or “speculative oil demand 
shock”.  
For identification, sign restrictions are imposed on the expanded 𝐴0
−1 matrix: 
𝑒𝑡 =
(
 
 
   𝑒1𝑡
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑
 𝑒2𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑎
 𝑒3𝑡
𝑟𝑝𝑜
𝑒4𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑣
)
 
 
= [
−     +          none      +
−     +          none      −
+     +          none      +
none none     none      +   
]
(
 
 
𝜀1𝑡
𝑠
𝜀2𝑡
𝑑
𝜀3𝑡
𝑖𝑑𝑖
 𝜀4𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑣
)
 
 
.        (6') 
These sign restrictions are imposed only on the impact of responses. Justifications are explained 
by Kilian and Murphy (2014).  These static sign restrictions are too weak to be informative for 
identification of the shocks. Additional restrictions are needed: a joint set of dynamic sign 
restrictions is imposed so that a negative flow supply shock leads to a dynamic response of the real 
price of oil that is constrained to be positive for at least 12 months.  In addition, following Kilian 
and Murphy (2014), we restrict the impact price elasticity of oil supply to fall within a bound of 
[0, 0.025] primarily because models identified purely based on sign restrictions produce values of 
this elasticity that are too large to be economically meaningful. Finally, contrary to the existing 
literature, Kilian and Murphy (2014) suggested using the price elasticity for oil demand “in use” 
(instead of the price elasticity for oil demand “in production”), because crude oil used (demanded 
for consumption) in our model could come from flow production and from crude oil in storage. 
Given that the price elasticity of oil demand in use is weakly negative on impact, we impose -0.8 
≤ “price elasticity of oil demand in use” ≤ 0 for the initial effect.   
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Although there are several approaches for estimating sign-identified VAR models, the 
Bayesian methods are the most common approach. Typically, researchers assume a standard 
Gaussian-inverse Wishart prior distribution for the reduced-form VAR parameters and a Haar 
distribution for the rotation matrix, used to construct the structural impact multiplier matrix for the 
impulse responses. The posterior distribution of the structural impulse responses is derived by 
applying the identification criteria to each draw of the parameters and rotation matrix from those 
prior distributions.  We will repeat this procedure for five million draws and discard structural 
models that imply impulse responses not obeying the identifying restrictions.   
3.3 Specification of the Step Two Regression 
After having estimated the oil-market shocks, the next step is to include them, one at a time, 
in equation (3) in order to test the null hypothesis of linearity for the effects of the oil-market 
shocks on exchange rate returns for each of the six countries.  By construction, the shocks 
estimated in the two alternative oil-market SVARs are orthogonal to other variables (in regards to 
(6’) see Kilian and Murphy, 2014, p. 463).  The extent to which these shocks are orthogonal to 
exchange rate returns in the second stage regression depends partly on how well the SVAR in the 
first stage is specified.  In the Kilian and Murphy (2014) model, the supply, demand, and 
speculative shocks are explicitly identified, whereas in the model of Kilian (2009) the speculative 
shock is only implicitly identified. However, for the second stage regression estimates to be 
consistent it is only required that the shocks are each a predetermined variable in regards to 
unexpected changes in exchange rate returns.  In other words, pre-determinedness means that there 
is no feedback from excess stock returns to the oil-market shocks within the same month.  This is 
a commonly used assumption when analyzing the effects of oil-market shocks on financial and 
macroeconomic variables (e.g., Kilian, 2009).  Hence, exchange rate returns are allowed to respond 
contemporaneously to each one of the oil-market shocks but, on the other hand, shocks to exchange 
rate returns do not affect oil supply (production), global real economic activity, the speculative oil 
demand, nor real oil prices within the month and there is a delay of one month or more, if there is 
any effect at all.   
A further potential complication arises because the oil-market shocks are generated regressors 
when used in the second stage regressions involving exchange rate returns.  Generally, this does 
not cause problems for coefficient estimates themselves but the estimates of their standard errors 
are not consistent because the sampling variation in the generated regressors is ignored 
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(Wooldrigde, 2010). Although, the exact implications depend on the specific model and 
assumptions.  We do not include lags on the generated regressors (the oil-market shocks).6  Our 
model hence fits the Model 4 in Pagan (1984, p. 232) with γ =0.  Pagan (p. 233) showed that for γ 
=0 the second stage ordinary least squares estimators are efficient and produce consistent estimates 
of coefficients and standard errors.  Murphy and Topel (1985) extended these results to models 
that are nonlinear.  Hence, and estimation and inference can proceed as usual in our second stage 
regressions. 
Teräsvirta (1998, p. 526) suggested using for the nonlinear specification the transition variable 
that yields the smallest p-value for the null hypothesis test when comparing a transition variable 
with and without a time lag and with different lag lengths. We analyze the impact of oil-market 
shocks i on exchange rate returns so that Xt = 𝜀𝑖𝑡 in equation (1) and we also choose the i
th oil-
market shock 𝜀𝑖𝑡 as the transition variable.  Further, for all oil-market shocks and all countries, the 
un-lagged transition variable is chosen with Teräsvirta’s approach, which is consistent with the 
foreign exchange market being an efficient market.  Hence, equation (3) reduces to: 
∆𝑓𝑥𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛿0𝜀𝑖𝑡
2 +  𝛿1𝜀𝑖𝑡
3 +  𝛿2𝜀𝑖𝑡
4 +  𝜆∆𝑓𝑥𝑡−1 +   𝜂𝑡.                                             (7) 
For the LSTR model, the null hypothesis of linearity that δ0=δ1=δ2=0 in equation (7) is tested with 
a Wald test.  The test for δ2=0 is a t-test of the LSTR versus the ESTR model.  In order to test 
linearity for the ESTR model, we impose δ2=0 and test the null hypothesis of linearity that δ0=δ1=0.  
On the other hand, the linear model itself can be tested by imposing linearity in equation (7) with 
δ0=δ1=δ2=0 and then test the null hypothesis that 𝛽1 = 0.  This is a test of the hypothesis that the 
oil-market shock in question has no (linear) effect on exchange rate returns.  
With Xt = 𝜏𝑡= 𝜀𝑖𝑡  the LSTR model for oil-market shocks takes the following form: 
7 
∆𝑓𝑥𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝜀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝜀𝑖𝑡{1 + exp [−𝛾(𝜀𝑖𝑡)]}
−1 +  𝜆∆𝑓𝑥𝑡−1 +   𝜂𝑡.                  (8)    
The linear model is given by  
                                                             ∆𝑓𝑥𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝜀𝑖𝑡 +  𝜆∆𝑓𝑥𝑡−1 +   𝜂𝑡.                                        (9) 
An identifying assumption for the LSTR model is that the adjustment speed γ>0. 
 
 
 
                                                          
6 This is consistent with efficient markets theory that implies that exchange rates should react to news without delay. 
7 In the empirical specification, we considered additional lags on ∆𝑓𝑥𝑡, however these did not improve the model fit. 
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3.4 Data 
The monthly data employed are the world crude oil production (supply), the global real 
economic activity index from Kilian (2009), real US refiners’ imported crude oil prices, above-
ground crude oil inventories, and the exchange rates.8 The sample period for the oil-market model 
start in January 1974.  The US refiners’ acquisition cost of crude oil is deflated by the US CPI to 
calculate real oil prices in dollars per barrel. Nominal exchange rates are converted to real 
exchange rates using the appropriate consumer price index (CPI) ratio between the two countries. 
We classify Brazil, Canada, Mexico, Norway, Russia and the UK as net oil exporting countries.  
The sample period used for estimating the effects of oil-market shocks on exchange rate returns of 
individual countries starts at the earliest with February 1976, due to observations used up for lag 
construction in the SVAR.  For Canada, Norway, and the UK models are estimated over the period 
from February 1976 to February 2014. For the other countries, the estimation period starts from 
the date when crawling-peg exchange rates were abandoned in favor of floating exchange rates 
(allowing for a one-period lag to calculate returns):  February 1995 for Brazil, February 1995 for 
Mexico, and October 1998 for Russia.  Brazil put in place the Plano Real in 1994 that introduced 
a new currency, and monetary and fiscal policy measures to stabilize the economy.  Mexico 
adopted floating exchange rates from 19 December 2014 and Russia after the Russian financial 
crisis from 2 September 1998 onwards.   
For all countries, the monthly real ex-post returns on exchange rates (foreign exchange returns) 
are constructed using Δfxt = 100 ln (fxt / fxt-1), where fxt is the real exchange rate in period t. Figure 
1 depicts real exchange rates for each country.  The share of the oil rent in GDP gives an indication 
of the importance of oil to the economy of each country.  In Figure 2, oil rents are the difference 
between the value of crude oil production at world prices and total costs of production.  We restrict 
our analysis to countries (and sample periods) with essentially independently floating exchange 
rates, as defined by the IMF (2004, 2014), that are among the top twenty crude oil exporters 
(Europe’s Energy Portal, 2016).   Four of these countries are classified by the IMF (2014, 2004) 
as countries with freely floating exchange rates:  Canada, Mexico, Norway and the UK.    The US 
dollar falls into this category of freely floating currencies as well, although it is not a net crude-oil 
exporter, but we use US-dollar based exchange rates.  Brazil’s real is classified as an independently 
floating exchange rate and we include it in our analysis. The Russian ruble is a more or less 
                                                          
8 Details for data sources are given in the Appendix.  
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managed floating currency with no explicitly stated anchor (IMF, 2004), however, currency 
management arrangements changed over time and it is debatable how freely the ruble has been 
floating (see Central Bank of the Russian Federation, 2014).  Nevertheless, we include Russia in 
our sample, noting that it ends before the Russian financial crisis in the second half of 2014 that 
lead to large interventions by the Russian Central Bank to support a collapsing ruble.           
Several other countries among the top twenty oil exporters have had fixed-peg currency 
arrangements, mostly to the US dollar (if not de jure then de facto): Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Qatar, 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (IMF, 2004, 2014).  The remaining countries among 
the top twenty managed and stabilized their currencies to various degrees (Algeria, Iran, Iraq, 
Nigeria, Kazakhstan and Venezuela), with some countries anchoring their currencies to the US 
dollar (Angola and Azerbaijan). In addition, several of these countries experienced political and 
civil unrest, sanctions on oil exports, and war, affecting foreign exchange market arrangements.    
 
3.5 The impact of oil-market shocks on exchange rates: results 
3.5.1 Unit roots and cointegration 
As a first step, we test the variables, as specified for the SVAR in equation (4), for unit roots 
with the DF-GLS test, using Akaike’s information criterion for lag-length selection and a constant 
term in the test regression. The percentage change in the oil supply is well described by a 
covariance-stationary process for our sample. The DF-GLS statistic takes on a value of -2.37, so 
that the null hypothesis of a unit root is comfortably rejected at the 5% level.  On the other hand, 
the percentage deviation from trend of the global economic activity index and the log of the real 
oil price show each unit root behavior.  The DF-GLS test takes on values of -0.80 and -1.05 (or -
1.59 if additionally a time trend is included in the test regression for oil prices) for these two 
variables, respectively.  The change in inventories also shows unit root behavior (the test statistic 
has a value of -1.27).  Therefore, the null hypotheses of a unit root cannot be rejected, even at the 
10% level, for all three variables.  However, the three variables are cointegrated, based on 
Johansen’s (1995) trace and maximum eigenvalue tests with p-values for the null hypothesis of no 
cointegration of 0.0005 and 0.01, respectively, and p-values for the hypothesis of at most one (two) 
cointegrating vector of 0.01 (0.11) for both tests.  This means that the evidence suggests the 
presence of two cointegrating vectors among the three variables.  There is also cointegration 
among the global economic activity index and the real price of oil: Johansen’s (1995) trace and 
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maximum eigenvalue tests produce p-values for the null hypothesis of no cointegration of 0.001 
and 0.002, respectively, and p-values for the hypothesis of at most one cointegrating vector of 0.07 
for both tests.  Engle-Granger tests confirm these findings. Our SVAR specifications hence fit the 
framework of Sims et al. (1990), as discussed in Section 3.2.1.  
In order to avoid spurious regressions due to the presence of unit roots in the second stage 
regression with exchange rates, we applied the DF-GLS test to real and nominal exchange rate 
returns.  We found empirical support of covariance stationarity for both exchange rate returns for 
all countries.  The null hypothesis of a unit root was rejected.  In addition, we tested all oil shocks 
individually and these time-series process also turned out to be stationary.9   
 
3.5.2 Results for real exchange rate returns:  Kilian’s (2009) oil-market shocks 
Table 1 reports the results for the various linearity tests for equation (7) with real exchange 
rate returns and the three structural oil-market shocks defined in equation (6) based on an SVAR 
with 24 lags.  All of the characteristic roots of the VAR are within the unit circle and the residuals 
are white noise.  Entries in bold mark significance at the 5% level. The third column of Table 1 
reports p-values for an oil supply shock for the various tests of equation (7).  We cannot reject the 
linear model with p-values of 0.11 in two cases and 0.20 or lager in all other cases, except for 
Russia.  That is we cannot reject the hypotheses that δ0=δ1=δ2=0 for the LSTR and δ0=δ1=0 for the 
ESTR model (with δ2=0 imposed) in those instances.  Next, we test for all countries whether oil 
supply shocks affect exchange rate returns in the linear model where δ0=δ1=δ2=0 is imposed in 
equation (7) and the null hypothesis that  𝛽1 = 0 is tested.  We do not find a significant linear 
influence of oil supply shocks on exchange returns, as p-values are 0.26 or larger.  On the other 
hand, the LSTR model is supported for oil supply shocks for Russia.  The hypothesis that 
δ0=δ1=δ2=0 is strongly rejected for Russia with a p-values of 0.002.  Also, the t-test for the 
hypothesis that δ2=0 is rejected with a p-value of 0.006, showing that the ESTR model with 
symmetric adjustment is rejected in favor of the LSTR model with asymmetric adjustment.  We 
note that the linear model would indicate for Russia that an oil supply shock has no impact on 
exchange rate returns due to a p-value of 0.26.  
The fourth column of Table 1 reports p-values for global aggregate demand shocks for the tests 
of equation (7).  We cannot reject the linear model for Brazil, Russia and the UK.  For these three 
                                                          
9 Detailed results are available from the authors on request.  
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countries, we test next whether aggregate demand shocks affect exchange rate returns in the linear 
model (δ0=δ1=δ2=0) in equation (7).  We find a significant linear influence of aggregate demand 
shocks only for the UK because we reject the null hypothesis that 𝛽1 = 0 with a p-value of 0.03.  
The p-values for Brazil and Russia are 0.35 and 0.62 respectively.  On the other hand, the LSTR 
model is supported for aggregate demand shocks for Canada, Mexico and Norway.   The 
hypothesis that δ0=δ1=δ2=0 is strongly rejected for these countries with p-values of 0.007 or less.  
Also, the t-tests for the hypothesis that δ2=0 are rejected for Canada, Mexico and Norway with p-
values of 0.03 or larger, thus showing support for the LSTR model.  It is interesting to note that 
the linear model would indicate instead incorrectly for Mexico and Norway that aggregate demand 
shocks have no impact on exchange rate returns because the p-values are 0.82 and 0.14, 
respectively.   
The last column in Table 1 presents results for oil-market-specific demand shocks.  At the 5% 
level of significance there is no support for the LSTR or the ESTR models for all six countries 
with p-values of 0.24 or larger, except for Norway where we get p-values of 0.09 and 0.08.  Hence, 
linearity cannot be rejected for all countries at the conventional 5% level of significance.  We test 
next whether oil-specific demand shocks have a significant linear influence on exchange rate 
returns.  The hypothesis 𝛽1 = 0 cannot be rejected for Brazil, Mexico and the UK with p-values 
of 0.20, 0.10 and 0.15, respectively.  This means that oil-specific demand shocks have no 
statistically significant effects on exchange returns for these countries.  On the other hand, the 
hypothesis that 𝛽1 = 0 is strongly rejected for Canada, Norway and Russia with p-values of 0.004 
or smaller.  Hence, oil-specific demand shocks significantly affect exchange returns for Canada, 
Norway and Russia, but only linearly.   
Table 2 reports the regression results for the nonlinear models chosen based on the analysis in 
Table 1.  The identifying assumption for the LSTR model that the adjustment speed γ>0 holds for 
all LSTR results with global aggregate demand shocks for Canada, Mexico and Norway, and with 
oil supply shocks for Russia. The nonlinear impact on the exchange rate returns, measured by 𝛽2, 
is negative for Canada, Norway and Russia, meaning that a positive shock leads to an appreciation 
of their currencies relative to the US dollar.  However, for Mexico the coefficient estimate for 𝛽2 
is positive, albeit not statistically significant at the 5% level, implying a depreciation of the 
Mexican peso.  A global aggregate demand shock affects the currencies of oil exporting countries 
through both the change in the price of oil and the change in the demand for other goods than oil 
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that they export.  An increase in global aggregate demand normally leads to an appreciation of the 
oil exporter’s currency, thus generating a Dutch disease effect.  But, depending on the share of oil 
exports in total exports, central banks may have incentives to actively counter appreciation 
pressures by accumulating foreign exchange reserves, thus lessening or reversing appreciation 
pressures (Buetzer et al., 2012).   
The 𝛽2-coefficient estimate in Table 2 is clearly statistically significantly different from zero 
for Canada (p=0.001) and is a borderline case for Mexico and Russia (p=0.07 in both cases), 
though the estimate of the adjustment speed  𝛾 is statistically significantly different from zero for 
both countries (p=0.02 and 0.01), as it is for Canada (p=0.001).  On the other hand, the 𝛽2 estimate 
is not significantly different from zero for Norway (p=0.29).  In addition, the coefficient estimate 
for 𝛾 for Norway is not significantly different from zero either (p=0.47), which indicates that an 
LSTR model does not describe adequately the nonlinear adjustment process for global aggregate 
demand shocks for Norway.  However, the results for Norway in Table 1 showed that the linear 
model is not adequate either in the case of global aggregate demand shocks.  It would seem that a 
larger SVAR model of the Norwegian economy is needed in order to capture the dynamic response 
of exchange rate returns in this case, which is beyond the scope of our paper.    
Table 3 reports the results for the shocks for which the linear model is supported by the data:  
oil-market-specific shocks for Canada, Norway and Russia, and global aggregate demand shocks 
for the UK.  All of these shocks show a negative and statistically highly significant estimate for 𝛽1 
so that a positive shock leads to an appreciation of the currencies of these countries relative to the 
US dollar, as one would expect. 
 
3.5.3 Results for real exchange rate returns: Kilian and Murphy’s (2014) oil-market 
shocks 
We estimate the four structural oil-market shocks from the SVAR, using the identification 
structure as given in equation (6’).  The SVAR was again estimated with 24 lags. We find in our 
sample 91 admissible structural VAR models that obey the identifying assumptions.  We estimated 
a value of -0.2539 for the posterior median of the price elasticity of oil demand in use.  We follow 
18 
 
Kilian and Murphy (2014) and choose among the admissible SVAR models the one that has an 
elasticity of oil demand in use closest to this value.10  
The third column of Table 4 reports p-values for an oil supply shock for the various linearity 
tests of equation (7) for real exchange rate returns.  We cannot reject the linear model for all 
countries because the p-values are larger than 0.05, with no value below 0.10, except for the UK 
for the LSTR model with a value of 0.09.  Next, we test whether oil supply shocks affect exchange 
rate returns in the linear model where δ0=δ1=δ2=0 is imposed and the null hypothesis is  𝛽1 = 0. 
We do not find a significant influence of oil supply shocks on exchange returns either, as all p-
values are 0.13 or larger. These results indicate that an oil supply shock has no impact on exchange 
rate returns for any country for the oil supply shocks derived from Kilian and Murphy’s (2014) 
SVAR. 
The fourth column of Table 4 reports p-values for global aggregate demand shocks.  We cannot 
reject the linear model for Brazil and the UK. For these two countries, we test next whether 
aggregate demand shocks affect exchange rate returns in the linear.  We find a significant linear 
influence at the 5% level for aggregate demand shocks only for the UK because we reject the null 
hypothesis that 𝛽1 = 0 with a p-value of 0.01, whereas for Brazil the p-value is 0.09.  On the other 
hand, the LSTR model is supported for aggregate demand shocks for Canada, Mexico, Norway 
and Russia. The hypothesis that δ0=δ1=δ2=0 is strongly rejected for these countries with p-values 
of 0.02 or less. Also, the t-tests for the hypothesis that δ2=0 lead to rejections of the ESTR model 
for these countries with p-values of 0.04 or smaller, showing support for the LSTR model.  The 
linear model would indicate instead incorrectly for Mexico and Russia that aggregate demand 
shocks have no impact on exchange rate returns because the p-values are 0.32 and 0.23.   
The last two columns in Table 4 present results for idiosyncratic oil-market-specific demand 
shocks and oil inventory (speculative oil demand) shocks. At the 5% level of significance there is 
no support for the LSTR or the ESTR models for all six countries with p-values of 0.12 or larger, 
except for Mexico where we get a p-value of 0.09 for the ESTR model for idiosyncratic shocks 
(“all other shocks”). Hence, linearity cannot be rejected for all countries at the conventional 5% 
level. Next, we test whether idiosyncratic and oil inventory shocks have a significant linear 
influence on real exchange rate returns.  In all cases, the hypothesis 𝛽1 = 0 cannot be rejected at 
                                                          
10 Alternatively, one could choose the most likely (or modal) model that maximizes the joint posterior density of a 
set of admissible models with the 100(1 − α)% highest posterior density. See Inoue and Kilian (2013, 2017).  
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the 5% level of significance. This means that idiosyncratic and oil inventory shocks have no 
statistically significant effects on real exchange returns for these countries.   
Table 5 lists the results for the nonlinear models chosen based on the analysis in Table 4, which 
is the LSTR model with global aggregate demand shocks in all cases. The identifying assumption 
that γ>0 holds for all countries: Canada, Mexico, Norway and Russia. The nonlinear impact on the 
exchange rate returns, measured by 𝛽2, is negative and statistically significantly different from 
zero for Canada, meaning that a positive shock leads to an appreciation of its currency relative to 
the US dollar.  However, for Mexico, Norway and Russia the coefficient estimates for 𝛽2 are 
positive, but their effects are not statistically significant at the 5% level, except for Norway.   
The estimates of the adjustment speed  𝛾 in Table 5 are not statistically significantly different 
from zero at the 5% significance level for all four countries.  Although, the coefficient estimate for 
𝛾 for Canada is a borderline case (p=0.06) in terms of significance, which indicates that an LSTR 
model may describe adequately the nonlinear adjustment process for Canada.  On the other hand, 
for Mexico, Norway and Russia it would seem that a larger SVAR model of their economies is 
needed in order to capture the dynamic responses.    
Table 6 lists the results for the global aggregate demand shock for the UK for which the linear 
model is supported by the data.  A negative and statistically significant estimate for 𝛽1 means that 
a positive shock leads to an appreciation of the British pound relative to the US dollar, as expected.   
 
3.5.4 Results for nominal exchange rate returns: Kilian and Murphy’s (2014) oil-market 
shocks 
In this section, we use nominal exchange rates instead of real exchange rates for calculating 
exchange rate returns.  This specification is motivated by the wealth channel that emphasizes the 
effects on nominal exchange rates, whereas the terms of trade channel mainly works through 
relative prices so that real exchange rates instead are more relevant (Beckmann and Czudaj, 2013).  
The results for the linearity tests with nominal exchange rate returns for equation (7) are reported 
in Table 7.   
For oil supply shocks, the test statistics support the same model specifications as in the model 
with real exchange rate returns in Table 4 in terms of LSTR, ESTR or linear specifications, even 
though individual p-values differ somewhat. For global aggregate demand shocks, qualitative 
results are again unaffected when real exchange rate returns are replaced with nominal ones, except 
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for Brazil, Russia and the UK.  The tests now support a linear model for Brazil and the ESTR 
model for the UK, whereas there are no significant effects at all for Russia.  For idiosyncratic oil-
market shocks the qualitative results align again with the results for real returns in Table 4, except 
for Norway, where the linear model is supported.  For speculative oil-inventory shocks, the results 
for the effects are unchanged in comparison with Table 4.  Estimation details for the statistically 
significant adjustment processes are reported in Tables 8 and 9.  The qualitative results are broadly 
consistent with those for real exchange rates in Tables 5 and 6 for Canada, Mexico and Norway.   
All shocks concerned are global aggregate demand shocks, except for Norway with linear 
idiosyncratic shocks affecting nominal exchange rates in Table 9.    
 
3.5.5 Overall assessment of the empirical results 
Generally, we find that the results obtained with the oil-market shocks from the SVAR of 
Kilian (2009) are broadly speaking similar to those derived from the SVAR of Kilian and Murphy 
(2014).  The only exceptions are the results for the oil-market specific shocks of Kilian (2009) as 
compared to the inventory shocks and idiosyncratic shocks of Kilian and Murphy (2014).  The 
speculative demand shocks are not explicitly identified in Kilian’s (2009) model and are defined 
as residual shocks in the oil market that are not due to either oil production (supply) or global 
aggregate demand (demand for oil in use).   The advantage of Kilian and Murphy’s (2014) SVAR 
is that it explicitly identifies shocks due to speculative behavior in the crude oil market and 
separates them form residual idiosyncratic shocks that are not important systematic drivers of oil 
prices.  We therefore rely on the model of Kilian and Murphy (2014) when assessing the effects 
of oil-market shocks on the exchange rates of major oil exporting countries. 
 We find that oil supply shocks are not driving the exchange rate movements of oil exporting 
countries, whether one looks at real or nominal exchange rates.  This result is in line with the 
findings of Kilian (2009) and Kilian and Vigfusson (2011a, 2011b) for US real GDP, and Basher 
et al. (2016) using a Markov-switching model.  Real and nominal exchange rates are instead driven 
by shocks to the global aggregate demand of crude oil in use.  Speculation in the crude oil market 
does not exert any systematic influence on the movement of exchange rates of the oil exporters 
relative to the US dollar, with the possible exception of the nominal exchange rate for Norway.  
Furthermore, the idiosyncratic shocks are indeed empirically unimportant in regards to exchange 
rates.   
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Global aggregate demand shocks, which are shocks to the global demand for industrial 
commodities, relate in a nonlinear way to real exchange rates for Canada, Mexico, Norway, and 
Russia, and in a linear way for the UK.  The relationship is also nonlinear for nominal exchange 
rate effects for Canada, Mexico, Norway, and the UK, and linear for Brazil.  That real and nominal 
exchange rates react differently to aggregate demand shocks is consistent with the theories 
discussed earlier for the channels through which oil-market shocks affect exchange rates. 
Furthermore, we note that a linear analysis would have concluded incorrectly that global aggregate 
demand shocks have no statistically significant effects on exchange rate returns for several cases. 
 
4. Conclusions and implications  
We examined the response of monthly exchange rate returns to oil price shocks for six major 
oil exporting countries with (more or less) flexible exchange rate regimes.  Other major oil 
exporting countries have had instead regimes of pegged or managed exchange rates.  We used two 
alternative structural VAR models: Kilian’s (2009) model with three oil-market shocks and Kilian 
and Murphy’s (2014) model with four oil-market shocks.  In contrast to the previous literature on 
oil-market shocks and exchange rates, we considered flexible nonlinear forms for adjustments to 
shocks, besides linear adjustment.  We specified logistic (asymmetric) and, alternatively, 
exponential (symmetric) nonlinear adjustment processes of the form that have been successfully 
employed before in the literature on empirical modelling of the dynamics of exchange rates 
themselves. This methodology allowed us to estimate quite parsimoniously a flexible reaction 
function for exchange rate returns to each of the oil-market shocks.  
Our findings are that the explicit identification of speculative oil-market shocks proposed by 
Kilian and Murphy (2014) is important for properly assessing the effects of shocks other than oil 
supply and global aggregate demand shocks.  Overall global oil supply shocks have no statistically 
significant effects on real and nominal exchange rate returns of oil exporting countries, for linear 
as well as nonlinear specifications. Nominal and real exchange rates are instead driven by crude 
oil demand “in use” that depends on global business cycle fluctuations and the demand for 
industrial commodities.  Our result are relevant for the debate on the role of oil price shocks, with 
Hamilton (2003, 2011, and 2016), among others, emphasizing oil supply shocks as the main driver 
on one side of the debate, and Kilian (2009), Kilian et al. (2009), Kilian and Vigfusson (2011a, 
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2011b), and Kilian and Murphy (2014) emphasizing global aggregate demand and speculative 
crude oil price shocks on the other side.    
Our study also showed that shocks directly originating in the oil market, that is oil supply and 
speculative oil demand shocks, have no asymmetric effects on real and nominal exchange rate 
returns.  Instead, the effects are either linear or symmetrically nonlinear, if they are significant at 
all.  This result is different from the results reported by Basher et al. (2016) for oil-market specific 
demand shocks derived in Kilian’s (2009) set-up: all oil exporters’ real exchange rates are 
statistically significantly affected in at least one regime in their nonlinear Markov models, looking 
at the preferred models in their Tables 5 and 6 based on regime classification measure values.      
Compared to the other three shocks, our results are different for global real economic activity 
shocks measured with the index of the global production of industrial commodities.  We should 
point out that, unlike other available monthly measures of output, this index includes emerging 
economies such as China and India (Kilian and Zhou, 2017).  We found empirical support for 
nonlinear asymmetric effects of aggregate demand shocks.   
 Our findings imply for future research that a structural vector autoregressive model with 
alternative nonlinear features, such as time-varying parameters, and additional macroeconomic 
variables would be a worthwhile venue for modelling the dynamics in the case of aggregate 
demand shocks.       
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Figure 1. Monthly real exchange rates 
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Figure 2.  Oil rents (% of GDP), annual figures 
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Table 1.  P-values for tests for equation (7) with real exchange  
                rate returns for the three oil-market shocks from 
                Kilian’s (2009) model 
  
     
Country Model  
tested 
Oil supply 
shock 
Aggregate 
demand 
shock 
Oil-
market 
specific 
shock  
     
Brazil LSTR 0.11 0.15 0.54 
 ESTR 0.31 0.86 0.80 
 Linear 0.85 0.35 0.20 
     
Canada LSTR 0.73 0.0001 0.44 
 ESTR 0.71 0.0004 0.36 
 δ2=0 -- 0.0001 -- 
 Linear 0.32 0.0001 0.0001 
     
Mexico LSTR 0.25 0.0004 0.94 
 ESTR 0.20 0.0003 0.85 
 δ2=0 -- 0.009 -- 
 Linear 0.35 0.82 0.10  
      
Norway LSTR 0.79 0.007 0.09  
 ESTR 0.60 0.02 0.08  
 δ2=0 -- 0.03 --  
 Linear 0.91 0.14 0.001  
      
Russia LSTR 0.002 0.40 0.72  
 ESTR 0.02 0.23 0.59  
 δ2=0 0.006 -- --  
 Linear 0.26 0.62 0.004  
      
UK LSTR 0.20 0.15 0.24  
 ESTR 0.11 0.13 0.69  
 Linear 0.39 0.03 0.15  
     
 
Notes: The tests for the LSTR model are Wald tests for the null hypothesis  
            that δ0=δ1=δ2=0. The tests for the ESTR model impose δ2=0 and test  
            the null hypothesis that δ0=δ1=0. The test of δ2=0 is a t-test of the  
            LSTR versus the ESTR model. The linear model test imposes  
            δ0=δ1=δ2=0 and tests that 𝛽1 = 0, which is a test of whether the oil 
            shock has any linear influence on exchange rate returns. Entries  
            in bold mark significance at the 5% level.    
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Table 2.  Estimates for the LSTR model in equation (8) with real exchange rate  
                returns for the three oil-market shocks from Kilian’s (2009) model  
 
       
Country Type of shock  Coefficient estimates 
  α β1 β2 γ λ 
       
Canada Global aggregate --  -- -0.06 24.8 0.28 
 Demand   (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
       
Mexico Global aggregate --  -- 0.08 8.3 -- 
 Demand   (0.07) (0.02)  
       
Norway Global aggregate --  -- -0.03 1.86 0.33 
 Demand   (0.29) (0.47) (0.001) 
       
Russia Oil supply --  -- -0.57 93.8 -- 
    (0.07) (0.01)  
       
 
Notes: A dashed line indicates that the variable associated with the coefficient was left out of  
           the model because it did not enter the regression statistically significantly at the 5% level. 
           We report p-values in parentheses with those values that are 0.05 or smaller in bold.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.  Estimates for the linear model in equation (9) with real exchange  
                rate returns for the three oil-market shocks from Kilian’s (2009) model 
 
      
Country Type of shock  Coefficient estimates 
  Α β1 λ1 λ2 
 
Canada Oil-market- -0.21 -0.07 0.28 -- 
 specific demand (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)  
      
Norway Oil-market- --  -0.06 0.33 -- 
 specific demand  (0.001) (0.001)  
      
Russia Oil-market- --  -0.09 0.20 -- 
 specific demand  (0.004) (0.01)  
      
UK Global aggregate --  -0.05 0.33 -010 
 Demand  (0.02) (0.001) (0.03) 
      
 
Notes: See the notes to Table 2.  λ1 is the coefficient of ∆𝑓𝑥𝑡−1 and λ2 is the  
           coefficient of  ∆𝑓𝑥𝑡−2. 
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Table 4.  P-values for tests for equation (7) with real exchange rate returns  
                for the four oil-market shocks from Kilian and Murphy’s (2014)  
                model 
 
       
Country Model  
tested 
Oil supply 
shock 
Aggregate 
demand 
shock 
All other 
shocks  
Oil 
inventory 
shock 
      
Brazil LSTR 0.35 0.35 0.69 0.51 
 ESTR 0.22 0.21 0.57 0.45 
 Linear 0.57 0.09 0.87 0.76 
      
Canada LSTR 0.56 0.0001 0.37 0.76 
 ESTR 0.39 0.0001 0.24 0.56 
 δ2=0 -- 0.0001 -- -- 
 Linear 0.65 0.0001 0.32 0.60 
      
Mexico LSTR 0.44 0.0001 0.14 0.99 
 ESTR 0.50 0.0006 0.09 0.99 
 δ2=0 -- 0.001 -- -- 
 Linear 0.55 0.32 0.52 0.41  
       
Norway LSTR 0.85 0.002 0.31 0.91  
 ESTR 0.97 0.02 0.98 0.78  
 δ2=0 -- 0.008 -- --  
 Linear 0.22 0.005 0.05 0.51  
       
Russia LSTR 0.37 0.02 0.70 0.53  
 ESTR 0.72 0.06 0.99 0.36  
 δ2=0 -- 0.04 -- --  
 Linear 0.75 0.23 0.09 0.37  
       
UK LSTR 0.09 0.10 0.62 0.12  
 ESTR 0.13 0.10 0.75 0.64  
 Linear 0.13 0.01 0.47 0.86  
      
Notes: See Table 1. 
 
 
Table 5.  Estimates for the LSTR model in equation (8) with real exchange rate returns  
                for the four oil-market shocks from Kilian and Murphy’s (2014) model 
 
       
Country Type of shock  Coefficient estimates 
  Α β1 β2 γ λ 
       
Canada Global aggregate --  -- -0.59 9.68 0.28 
 Demand   (0.0001) (0.06) (0.0001) 
       
Mexico Global aggregate 0.20 -664.9 1329.6 0.001 -- 
 Demand (0.007) (0.94) (0.95) (0.95)  
       
Norway Global aggregate --  -- 440.2 0.0006 0.30 
 Demand   (0.0001) (0.99) (0.95) 
       
Russia Global aggregate 
demand 
-0.70  
(0.005) 
-0.85 
(0.03) 
1.41 
(0.24) 
0.68 
(0.43) 
0.09 
(0.02) 
       
Notes: See Table 2. 
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Table 6.  Estimates for the linear model in equation (9) with  
                real exchange rate returns for the four oil-market shocks  
                from Kilian and Murphy’s (2014) model 
 
     
Country Type of shock  Coefficient estimates 
  Α β1 λ1 
 
UK Global aggregate -- -0.32 0.30  
 Demand  (0.01) (0.0001) 
     
     
Notes: See Table 3. 
 
 
 
Table 7.  P-values for tests for equation (7) with nominal exchange rate returns  
                for the four oil-market shocks from Kilian and Murphy’s (2014) model 
 
       
Country Model  
tested 
Oil supply 
shock 
Global 
aggregate 
demand shock 
All other 
(idiosyncratic) 
shocks  
Oil 
inventory 
shock 
      
Brazil LSTR 0.29 0.26 0.77 0.61 
 ESTR 0.17 0.16 0.69 0.56 
 Linear 0.46 0.04 0.89 0.69 
      
Canada LSTR 0.85 0.0001 0.42 0.51 
 ESTR 0.70 0.0001 0.24 0.31 
 δ2=0 -- 0.0001 -- -- 
 Linear 0.60 0.0001 0.57 0.61 
      
Mexico LSTR 0.05 0.002 0.77 0.79 
 ESTR 0.26 0.03 0.58 0.63 
 δ2=0 -- 0.004 -- -- 
 Linear 0.24 0.12 0.13 0.80  
       
Norway LSTR 0.72 0.0007 0.24 0.97  
 ESTR 0.75 0.008 0.84 0.96  
 δ2=0 -- 0.007 -- --  
 Linear 0.43 0.0008 0.04 0.35  
       
Russia LSTR 0.96 0.60 0.76 0.09  
 ESTR 0.97 0.66 0.61 0.33  
 Linear 0.21 0.22 0.34 0.17  
       
UK LSTR 0.09 0.03 0.61 0.19  
 ESTR 0.11 0.02 0.69 0.69  
 δ2=0 -- 0.21 -- --  
 Linear 0.30 0.008 0.69 0.77  
      
Notes: See Table 1.  
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Table 8.  Estimates for the LSTR model in equation (8) with nominal exchange rate  
               returns for the four oil-market shocks from Kilian and Murphy’s (2014) model 
 
       
Country Type of shock  Coefficient estimates 
  α β1 β2 γ λ 
       
Canada Global aggregate --  -- -0.21 152.4 0.17 
 Demand   (0.09) (0.60) (0.0001) 
       
Mexico Global aggregate -- -514.9 1029.3 0.001 0.21 
 Demand -- (0.59) (0.57) (0.95) (0.08) 
       
Norway Global aggregate 0.19  -55.6 4370.6 0.0006 0.35 
 Demand (0.09) (0.005) (0.09) (0.99) (0.0001) 
       
UK Global aggregate 0.11  -0.56 15276.3 14.8 0.30 
 Demand (0.54) (0.12) (0.41) (0.28) (0.0001) 
       
Notes: See Table 2.  
 
 
 
Table 9.  Estimates for the linear model in equation (9) with  
                nominal exchange rate returns for the four oil-market  
                shocks from Kilian and Murphy’s (2014) model 
 
     
Country Type of shock  Coefficient estimates 
  α β1 λ1 
 
Brazil Global aggregate -- -0.49 0.40  
 Demand  (0.04) (0.0001) 
     
Norway Idiosyncratic -- -0.25 0.37 
   (0.04) (0.0001) 
     
Notes: See Table 3. 
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Appendix: Data Sources 
Monthly data are used. The world oil supply (crude oil production in millions of barrels per 
day) is taken from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) at 
http://www.eia.gov/totalenergy/data/monthly/index.cfm.  The percentage deviation from trend for 
the global real economic activity index is from Lutz Kilian’s website at the University of Michigan 
http://www-personal.umich.edu/~lkilian/paperlinks.html. On the usefulness of this index for 
measuring real global economic activity, see Kilian and Zhou (2017).  Data on US refiners’ 
acquisition cost of crude oil are from http://www.eia.gov/petroleum/data.cfm#prices. 
Global crude oil inventories are defined as crude oil stocks in storage above the ground. They 
are approximated by OECD crude oil inventories.   We updated the data available from Kilian and 
Murphy (2014) beyond August 2008.  For this purpose, we used data from the EIA and data 
adjustments kindly supplied to us by Lutz Kilian.  The OECD database does not report crude oil 
inventories but only petroleum inventories. Therefore, following Kilian and Murphy (2014), we 
scaled US crude oil inventories with the ratio of OECD petroleum stocks to US petroleum stocks.   
Kilian and Lee (2014) studied the reliability of using this proxy variable for crude oil inventories 
above the ground. They found that an alternative measure of inventories derived from proprietary 
data leads generally to similar results, despite the correlation between the two inventory measures 
being not very high.   
Nominal exchange rates for Brazil, Canada, Mexico, Norway, and the UK are taken from the 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’ FRED database, retrieved at 
http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/categories/15.  Except for the UK, exchange rates are quoted 
as foreign currency per US dollar.  For the UK, we inverted the exchange rate to make it directly 
comparable to that of the other countries.  The CPI data were sourced from the OECD data web 
site:  http://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?querytype=view&queryname=221.  The exchange rate 
between the Russian ruble and the US dollar was taken from Quandl (https://www.quandl.com/).  
The annual data on oil rents in Figure 2 (as of 18 March 2016) are from the World Development 
Indicators site at http://wdi.worldbank.org/table/3.15. Data for Russia are available from 1989 
onwards. 
 
